Showing posts with label Lebanon. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Lebanon. Show all posts

Friday, February 3, 2006

Reasons to be cheerful

According to Dr Arnall, of the University of Cardiff, January 24 is the most depressing day of the year, if you live in the northern hemisphere. He supports his claim, not by speculation or anecdote, but through science, and he has an equation to prove it. His model breaks down as: (W + (D-d)) x TQ divided by M x NA, where W is weather, ) debt, ) monthly salary, T time since Christmas, Q time since failed quit attempt, M low motivational levels and NA the need to take action. If the science makes no sense to you, what he is saying is that, by January 24, if you live in the northern hemisphere, the fun of Christmas has worn off, credit-card bills are coming in, the days are cold and dark, and all those resolutions you made for the new year have been broken. In other words, you're sitting around feeling sorry for yourself because you're fat, broke, living in a rainy dreary climate and probably smoking too much.

Of course, if you live in the southern hemisphere, then certain parts of the equation are defunct, particularly the weather. In fact, the condition of 'seasonal affective disorder', or SAD, as it is fittingly known, a type of depression that follows the seasons, is more common the farther north you go. Of course, you can still be fat, broke and too hot in the summer in South Africa but, scientifically speaking, South Africans should be happy people with all the sunshine.

However, the World Database of Happiness (yes, it does exist) rates South Africa as 'a middle-of-range' place when it comes to happiness. South Africa scores 5,5 on the happiness scale, along with Kenya, Lebanon and South Korea. Denmark and Switzerland are allegedly happy places, scoring over 8. Ireland and the UK score in the high range, with 7,6 and 7,1 respectively. Zimbabwe and Moldova are among the unhappiest places on earth.

Having said that, the database also highlights inequality in responses between those reporting high and those reporting low levels of happiness. South Africa has a high inequality score, meaning that, although South Africans are, on average, moderately happy, some people are clearly much happier than others. This is not surprising, given the disparities in the country. That said, I am not convinced by the science of happiness and I take issue with Arnall's equation, because it is not culturally and contextually relevant. So let me help him out.

If he wanted an equation for happiness in Northern Ireland, it would have to go something like this: (W + (D-d)) x TQ divided by M x NA, where W is the weather (of course), D downtime of the political institutions, d monthly salary paid to politicians for not participating in the downed political institutions, T time spent complaining that someone else has got more political concessions than you, Q time passed since blaming someone else for all your problems, M low motivational levels, owing to excessive intake of chips and Guinness and NA the time wasted watching too much reality TV.

And for South Africa, happiness could be measured as (W + (D-d)) x TQ divided by M x NA, where (W) is wealth (meaning having your basic needs met, not being affluent, because we all know money cannot buy happiness), D political downtime since the last corruption scandal or the firing of a Deputy President, d monthly salary spent on replacing stolen goods, T time wasted filling in insurance forms, Q time spent braaing on the weekends, M low motivational levels, owing to losing to Australia at cricket or rugby or watching Bafana Bafana crash out of a major soccer tournament, and NA time wasted believing everything you read in newspapers and magazines.

This article by Brandon Hamber was published on Polity and in the Engineering News on 3 February 2006 as part of the column "Look South". Copyright Brandon Hamber.

Wednesday, October 28, 1998

A Review of Islamic Fundamentalism: Myths and realities

A Review of Islamic Fundamentalism: Myths and realities by Ahmed S Moussali (ed). Reading, UK: Ithaca Press. 1998, 348pp. Index. Hb. ISBN 0-86372-232-6.

"Islam has been seen to be well suited to play the role of the bad guy after the Cold War, for it is large, frightening and anti-Western and thrives on poverty and anger. It is spread over vast tracts of the world, and so the countries of Islam could be shown on TV as large maps of green, as the communist countries used to appear in red." (p.6)

The fetishism of the West, and particularly the United States, with the creation of a new enemy after the end of the Cold War is an increasing point for international concern. On one hand there is a growing awareness in the international community of the fabrication of an enemy for a plethora of self-serving reasons. Yet, on the other, the overwhelming ignorance of the Muslim world, and the enormous publicity of extremist terror attacks, has fanned fears of a new Islamic "green threat". Ahmad Moussali and his fellow contributors set out to rationally and systematically challenge the myths that perpetuate these anxieties.

The book begins with several complex theoretical chapters that cover a number of key debates. These range from the irrelevancy of Western social science in understanding the Muslim world, to the philosophical and political underpinnings of the views and ideologies of differing Islamic traditions on religion, state, democracy and human rights. These intricate theoretical chapters will be helpful to researchers with little understanding of Islamic fundamentalism, as well as those with a larger base of knowledge. They demonstrate that although any understanding of Islamic fundamentalism cannot be easily conflated into the framework of Western thought, fundamentalism is "not beyond intellectual, economic, political and cultural analyses" (p.25). This is critical, as the remaining chapters all converge on the need to understand Islamic fundamentalism and its growth contextuality.

The instructive and in-depth case studies of Algeria, Lebanon, the Occupied Territories, Saudi Arabia and Egypt clearly show that the resurgence of Islamic activism cannot be divorced from the local socio-economic and political context. The case studies convincingly demonstrate that most major fundamentalist groups, notwithstanding a few widely publicised groups that are engaged in exclusivist uncompromising revolutions, are not necessarily or inherently juxtaposed in thought and action to democracy and pluralism. The detailed and contextual analyses in the case studies implicitly challenges the Western myths (and consequent fears) of an all-encompassing hegemonic and extremist Islamic movement.

The book will be instructive to those not familiar with the theoretical foundations and historical context of Islamic conviction in the contemporary world. However, the book does not extensively explain, and that is not its purpose, why the West has chosen fundamentalism as its new enemy. Rather Ahmad Moussalli and his fellow contributors choose to demystify Islamic fundamentalism through developing a nuanced and contextual understanding. A refined analysis of this type is critical in moving Western conflict resolution practitioners, and the public, away from the reductionist view that the biggest threat to peace is the clash of irreconcilable civilisations rather than the socio-economic problems, and the resultant opposition, created by rapid economic liberalisation.

Published by Brandon Hamber in the Ethnic Conflict Research Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1999.