Amnesty a line in the sand? It’s not even close

If we know anything about the Johnson government in the UK, they are not great at sticking to agreements or taking the views of the devolved nations seriously. The recent statement by the Secretary of State, Brandon Lewis, proposing new legislation to enforce a statute of limitations for all conflict-related violations in Northern Ireland fits this mould.

In July 2019, following a 15-month consultation on the legacy proposal in the Stormont House Agreement (SHA) of 2014 agreed by all political parties, the British Government committed to its full implementation. Two years later, it is now proposing to pull the SHA apart.

The recent proposals remove a focus on justice and investigation, favouring information recovery and storytelling under an undefined banner of reconciliation. All of Northern Ireland’s five main political parties, the Irish government, civil society organisations and most victims’ groups are heavily critical of what amounts to an amnesty for conflict-era offences. Yet, the views of the people of Northern Ireland, and especially victims of both state and non-state violence, seem to matter little.

Ostensibly, Northern Ireland victims are less important than a Tory manifesto pledge to stop so-called “vexatious” legal cases against former British soldiers, even if the price is also a paramilitary amnesty.

Yet, the actual case for amnesty in Lewis’ statement is rather flimsy.

Firstly, Lewis points out that criminal investigations are increasingly unlikely to deliver in court. We know as time passes this is not incorrect. But because justice is unlikely, should prosecutions be abandoned? Could we imagine doing the same for other crimes such as rape because it has a low conviction rate? Choosing to abandon prosecution is not a logistical issue but a political one.

Secondly, it is stated that the current system is not working. But there is no current system. It is a mishmash of processes. No systematic and over-arching attempt has been made to deal with the past in Northern Ireland, despite a set of agreed proposals being put forward in the SHA.

Thirdly, it is implied that amnesty is the only viable route. Yet the British consultation on the SHA points out that the overwhelming view from the 17,000 responses was that amnesty was not appropriate. Two years ago, it was perfectly feasible for the other SHA mechanisms such as storytelling and information recovery to run alongside justice processes, yet suddenly this is off the table.

There are other options under discussion. For example, British soldiers remain eligible for the same deal as paramilitaries in terms of early release under the Belfast Agreement. If convicted, a maximum of two years can be served for conflict crimes. A discussion on reducing the length of this requirement to zero is an option. More radically, another option is to consider amnesty in exchange for truth as per the South African model.

Finally, Lewis argues that it is the criminal justice process that is hampering reconciliation. Is the implication that offering a blanket amnesty will lead to those who committed crimes miraculously coming forward, sharing the truth and seeking reconciliation with those they harmed? If so, this is devoid of reality.

Furthermore, contrary to Lewis’ assertion of amnesty fostering reconciliation, the British government’s own consultation on the SHA points out that curtailing the right to justice would “risk progress towards reconciliation”, not promote it.

What we also know internationally is that amnesties can create a short-term hiatus in a political process, but when justice is evaded, it simply festers and re-emerges rather than creating reconciliation.

The Spanish 1977 amnesty or “pact of forgetting”, following the Franco regime, has not stopped recent attempts to prosecute those responsible. Spain remains deeply divided. In Chile, the amnesty passed by Pinochet in 1978 was overturned in 1998. This led to dozens of prosecutions of those responsible for disappearance and torture over the following decades. Even in South Africa, there are new moves to prosecute those who did not avail of the amnesty offered by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

In this context, the current proposals are not the product of some difficult soul-searching and the only option left on the table. It is a cynical and calculated political move.

It fits a pattern of political evasion of truth that has been and continues to be fundamentally unjust to all victims. It demonstrates how little Northern Ireland victims mean to the UK government.

The major stumbling block to reconciliation and dealing with the past in Northern Ireland is not victims trying to exercise their rights to justice, but 50 years of avoidance, untruths and injustice.

What is needed now is courageous leadership that fulfils previous commitments and confronts the past head-on, not politicians trying to draw fanciful lines in the sand.

Far from dealing with the past, the proposed amnesty will simply redraw the battle lines for the future.

Published by Brandon Hamber in the Belfast Telegraph, 15 July 2021.

Photo credit: “The Troubles,Belfast, Northern Ireland 1970–2 Coldstream Guards” by Kaspar C Licensed CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

The legacy of Northern Ireland’s past: Mental Health

Ulster University professors Siobhan O’Neill, left, and Brandon Hamber argue that understanding the effect of the Troubles related trauma, including transgenerational trauma, is vital for fostering peace building in Northern Ireland.

The conflict was a significant and distinctive stressor in the life of the community in Northern Ireland for over 40 years. The world mental health survey found that whilst around 71.5 percent of the population have minimal levels of mental illness, the mental health difficulties of at least half of the remaining 28.5 percent (approx. 213,000 adults) appear to be directly related to the Troubles (Bolton, 2017; McLafferty et al., 2016; O’Neill et al., 2015). The same study showed that 39 percent of the population experienced a traumatic event that was related to the Troubles. Such events included bombings, shootings, and witnessing killings and mutilations. The research demonstrated the depth and scale of the mental health needs of the Northern Ireland population, however progress on meeting those needs and providing the evidence-based treatments for complex trauma-related illnesses has been slow.

In the meantime, the consequences are manifest in the form of social unrest and high rates of suicide (O’Neill et al., 2014) and prescribed medication (Benson et al., 2018). Mental illness stifles healing and empathy. Psychological therapies can help individuals make meaning from their experiences, which not only reduces their suffering, but also allows them to place the experience in context, to foster recovery. Such processes at both a personal, and community level can promote peace-building, and potentially create the environment for peace.

For victims and survivors of trauma, the issues of truth, justice, accepting responsibility, compensation and official acknowledgement are also part of this “meaning making” and are interwoven with healing (Hamber, 2009). In fact, healing, often promoted by addressing wider victim issues such as truth and justice, in such circumstances may provide the conditions for post-traumatic growth (Joseph, 2015).The opposite is also true, that failing to address the wider needs of survivors (such as a desire for justice or truth) can have negative psychological consequences into the long term (Hamber, 2009).

We made these points in response to the consultation on the proposed legacy institutions (O’Neill and Hamber, 2018, see our full response), and also noted that the institutions will have a profound impact on the mental health of the individuals who engage with them, those who for whatever reason choose not to, and those with existing trauma-related conditions who either participate, or hear about them from the media and other sources. It is vital that the mental health of those affected is protected through this process.

The consultation – ‘Addressing the legacy of Northern Ireland’s past’ – includes proposals to implement the four new legacy institutions set out in the 2014 Stormont House Agreement (SHA) and the Government’s manifesto for Northern Ireland 2017. A key element of the Stormont House Agreement is that all of these bodies will be under statutory obligations to act in ways that are balanced, proportionate, transparent, fair and equitable.

Our six key recommendations in relation to the legacy institutions:

1. The institutions should adopt a victim and survivor-centred perspective. The process should be scrutinised from the perspective of the victim, and their journey through engagement with one or more of the structures.
2. Support for victims through the process should be standardised and offered on an equal basis to all survivors across the legacy institutions.
3. A process of demand profiling and impact assessment should be undertaken prior to the commencement of the work of the institutions.
4. The institutions should adopt a trauma-informed approach that: Realises the impact of trauma and understands potential paths for recovery; Recognises the signs and symptoms of trauma, responds by integrating knowledge about trauma into policies, procedures, and practices; and seeks to actively resist re-traumatisation. (SAMSHA, 2018). This particularly means that the legacy structures and processes should screen people for trauma-related conditions and facilitate them in receiving treatment.
5. We recommend that a Mental Health Advisory Group with an expert chair, is convened to oversee and monitor the implementation of all four institutions.
6. We need to protect the mental wellbeing of those who work within the institutions particularly those who witness the testimonies of the victims and survivors and those tasked with delivering justice and establishing a level of need.

Citing this Article

O’Neill, Siobhan and Hamber, Brandon (2019). Addressing the legacy of Northern Ireland’s past. The View Digital, Issue 51, pp.30-31.

Source

This article was published by The View Digital (Issue 51, 2019), to download a Pdf of the article as it appeared, click here. To download the full edition of The View Digital which features "An in-depth look at victims, survivors and legacy issues from the Troubles", click here.

Learn more about The View Digital, click here.

References

Benson, T., Corry, C., O’Neill, S., Murphy, S., Bunting, B. (2018). Use of prescription medication by individuals who died by suicide in Northern Ireland. Arch Suicide Res, 22, 1, 139-152. Download. 

Bolton, D. (2017). Conflict, peace and mental health: Addressing the consequences of conflict and trauma in Northern Ireland. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Hamber, B. (2009). Transforming Societies After Political Violence: Truth, Reconciliation and Mental Health. New York: Springer.

Joseph, S. (2015). A person-centred perspective on working with people who have experienced psychological trauma and helping them move forward toward post-traumatic growth. Person-Centered and Experiential Psychotherapies, 14(3), 178-190.

McLafferty, M., Armour, C., O'Neill, S., Murphy, S., Ferry, F., Bunting B. (2016). Suicidality and profiles of childhood adversities, conflict related trauma and psychopathology in the Northern Ireland population. J Affect Disord, 200, 97-102. Download.

O'Neill, S., Ferry, F., Murphy, S.D., et al. (2014). Patterns of suicidal ideation and behaviour in Northern Ireland and associations with conflict-related trauma. PLOSOne, download.

O’Neill, S., Armour, C., Bolton, B. et al., (2015). Towards a Better Future: The Transgenerational Impact of the Troubles on Mental Health. Belfast, CVSNI. Retrieved from here.

O’Neill, S. and Hamber, B. (2018). Consultation Response: Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland's Past. The need for a victim and survivor centred, trauma-informed approach. Retrieved from here, 25th Feb 2019.

SAMHSA (2018). Trauma-Informed Approach and Trauma-Specific Interventions. Download.

A new dawn for South Africa, but a false start for Northern Ireland

South Africa has a new leader; the current negotiators in the North feel like a spent force               

In a strange way the South Africa and Northern Ireland peace processes have always been linked. In the 1990s both were heralded as examples of how deep divisions could be overcome, and co-operation fostered between former enemies. Other connections were more direct, such as the former ANC lead negotiator and now new South African president Cyril Ramaphosa’s role in the decommissioning processes as an inspector on behalf of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning.

Two decades later, however, both peace processes have lost their shine.

In Northern Ireland a lot has been achieved. For example, a stable powersharing arrangement was running for a number of years, there has been substantial police reform and a dramatic decrease in political deaths.

However, the powersharing government has been collapsed for over a year. Social division also remains. Some 90 per cent of social housing is still single-identity, according to the Northern Ireland Federation of Housing Associations. Only 7 per cent of children go to integrated schools.

Although paramilitary activity has decreased, there were 30 bombing incidents last year. Assaults, mainly on young males, by paramilitary groups have continued at roughly consistent rates for the last 10 years.
Significant gains

For South Africa, redressing decades of racial inequality has been a priority. Significant gains have been made. For example, 93 per cent of South Africans now have access to potable water compared to 62 per cent in 1994. The ANC government has built three million homes, housing 16 million people.

However, a backlog of 2.5 million houses remains. The official unemployment rate stands at a staggering 26 per cent. On top of this, the former government led by Jacob Zuma was throughout beset with serious corruption allegations.

However, unlike Northern Ireland, which has now seen a breakdown in the negotiations to re-establish powersharing, South Africa saw Ramaphosa instated as president. A wave of new-found optimism has swept the country. In his state-of-the nation address on Friday, Ramaphosa spoke of a new dawn, turning the tide against corruption and tackling inequalities, while maintaining economic stability.

The campaign to remove Zuma has been sustained over a number of years, and has included media exposés of corruption, large public demonstrations by opposition parties and civil society organisations, a series of court cases that have opened the way for the prosecution of Zuma and his cronies, and latterly a determined bloc inside the ANC and its allies to remove Zuma from office.

South Africans have a new belief in democracy and people power, and have learned first-hand the value of a free media and an independent judiciary. There is new hope in the constitution, the rule of law and the institutions developed to protect democracy.
Frustration

In Northern Ireland things feel very different. Everywhere one turns you hear people complaining about the inability of politicians to make a deal. The frustration is palpable, yet the malaise continues despite the ongoing division, Brexit and economic difficulties looming large.

Like Zuma’s administration that suffered from illegitimacy and drift, the Stormont talks have lost their way, and have lost touch with the people.

While South Africans are optimistic on the promises of Ramaphosa’s “new dawn”, Northern Ireland wallows in the tatters of what was once called a “fresh start”. So why the difference, and what can be done?

First, in South Africa there has at last been a qualitative change in leadership. In contrast, the current negotiators in the North feel like a spent force. Although some top positions in Northern Ireland have changed, those who were there at the start of the current impasse remain largely the same. One way to change this dynamic is to rework the talks structure to include all political parties, bringing in new leadership.

Second, civil society participation has been key to the new South African impetus. It is time to reignite civil society interest in the Northern Ireland peace process. New ways of people interacting with the talks have to be found. Ideas such as a citizens’ assembly have been proposed. Politicians need to encourage new civic interactions rather than corralling around the stale and secret Stormont talks.
New energy

Of course, South Africa is not a perfect or a directly comparable model. The new energy will dwindle over time if expectations are not met. Time will tell if Ramaphosa can deliver. But the current situation in South Africa reminds us once again that change is possible and the re-set button can be pushed. Hope and vitality can be restored to the body politic.

We forget at our peril that a commitment to a new vision, farsighted leadership, civil society engagement and, ultimately, the willingness to compromise is what drove the remarkable changes in Northern Ireland and South Africa in the 1990s.

Unless this genuine spirit for transformation can be reignited in Northern Ireland, as it has been sparked in South Africa recently, the risk is that the Belfast Agreement will become a rather sullied footnote in history.

Published by Professor Brandon Hamber, John Hume and Thomas P O’Neill chair in peace based at the International Conflict Research Institute (INCORE), Ulster University, Irish Times, 20 February 2018

The original article is available here in the Irish Times, 20 February 2019

Northern Ireland (failed?) Agreement of 31 December 2013

Over the second half of 2013, US diplomat Richard Haass (Chair) and Meghan O'Sullivan (Vice Chair) were ask to independently chair an all party panel to address outstanding contentious issues in the Northern Ireland peace process. They were asked to achieve consensus recommendations whenever possible on the specific issues of parades and protests; flags, symbols and emblems, and related matters; and the past (full mandate).

The Panel’s work took nearly six months, including 33 days of meetings and negotiations, and involved some 100 meetings with 500 people and 600 submissions from interested groups and the public.  A document, said to be the 7th draft, was produced on 31 December 2013, however, was not ratified by all parties. There have however been several calls to move forward on the parts of the document where there is consensus. 

Agreement Document of 31 December 2013

• Final and full text  (download)
• Summary Fact Sheet (download)

Haass and O'Sullivan 

• Statement by Haass and O'Sullivan (8 January 2014, download)
• Haass and O'Sullivan Op-Ed in Belfast Telegraph (27 December 2013, link)

Selection of Office Party Responses (Press Releases)

• SDLP: UUP a ‘Pontius Pilate moment – 7 Jan 2014
• Sinn Fein: Unionist leaders need to do just that - 7 Jan 2014
• UUP: Executive statement on Haass - 6 Jan 2013
• Sinn Fein: Unionist Leaders Must Decide - 3 Jan 2014
• UUP: Executive to meet - 2 Jan 2014
• Sinn Fein: Adams welcomes publication - 31 Dec 2013
• Alliance: This isn’t the comprehensive agreement - 31 Dec 2013
• DUP: "We must not lose the momentum" - 31 Dec 2013

Lack of Integration Strategy Undermining Northern Ireland's Political Progress

University of Ulster Press Release

The failure to progress a sharing and integrated strategy in Northern Ireland is undermining the achievements of the Good Friday Agreement, a leading University of Ulster academic has warned.

Professor Brandon Hamber (pictured) , the director of the University of Ulster's international conflict resolution research centre INCORE, told a joint committee of MPs and TDs in Dublin that significant strides had been made since the Agreement was forged 15 years ago.

However the Magee-based academic cautioned, as recent events in Northern Ireland have shown, in the absence of any strategy to deliver the integration envisaged in the Good Friday Agreement, the political process was vulnerable to stresses.

Professor Hamber told the meeting of the Joint Committee on the Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement that we need to acknowledge the progress that has been made, violence has decreased and the institutions are functioning but segregation remains.

“What we do know is integrated schooling has not changed significantly. Although there have been advancements, they have not been dramatic.If you look at mixed marriages, for example, these types of factors have not changed dramatically.

"In numerous quarters, this has been put down to a lack of policy on how sharing and integration will take place…the whole spirit of integration as expressed in the Agreement has not yet been realised.

"Of course, policy does not determine practice but it does provide us with a yardstick for measurement and it helps us create a vision for action in terms of what might be needed”.

Professor Hamber told the joint committee of TDs and MPs that other conflict resolution processes around the world had shown addressing underlying issues, including economic concerns and segregation, would provide stronger social cohesion and a greater guarantee of peace in the long term.

If underlying causes of conflict are not addressed, Professor Hamber said, "In the conflict field, we would talk about this as a negative peace. In other words, there is a context where political violence has decreased but a lot of the underlying issues that potentially can fuel violence still remain in place”.

Specifically Professor Hamber called for an integrated strategy in Northern Ireland on dealing with sectarianism, flags, parades and dealing with the past, and a recommitment to the essence of the 1998 Agreement, which talks specifically about the importance of integration in schooling and housing as key to reconciliation.

Note to Editors:







INCORE (International Conflict Research Institute) is a joint University of Ulster and United Nations University project based on the Magee campus. It aims to address the causes and consequences of conflict in Northern Ireland and internationally while also promoting conflict resolution management and peace-building strategies.

Professor Hamber was giving evidence in Leinster House to the Joint Committee of the Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement alongside Peter Sheridan, Chief Executive, Co-operation Ireland and Neil Jarman, Director, Institute for Conflict Research.

The joint committee of TD and Northern Ireland MPs is chaired by Deputy Joe McHugh TD.

For further information, please contact:

David Young Telephone: 028 9036 6074 Email: David Young

What does peace mean in the South?

Widespread relief greeted the 1998 Good Friday Agreement when over 94% of people in the Republic of Ireland voted to give up the territorial claim to the whole island enshrined in the Constitution until such time as there was a consensus to do otherwise. The desire to end the conflict was strongly endorsed in both jurisdictions, sustained by a dogged and consistent commitment to peace by the then Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern – a fact now buried, for the time being at least, under the debris of the current economic crisis.

The Southern reaction to the Peace Process varied depending on how closely affected by the conflict you were. For those living in the border region, the disappearance of the British Army and the opening of border roads, facilitating ease of movement between towns and villages whose hinterlands and livelihoods had been disrupted by the violence, was greatly welcomed.

Cross-border cooperation in tourism, infrastructure, policing and community development, all boosted by EU Peace funding, has allowed fractured communities to pick up the pieces and start again. For many Protestants in the Southern border counties, there was encouragement to engage in public life again after an ‘eyes down, mouths shut’ policy of trying to survive in a climate of fear and intimidation in a region deeply affected by the violence across the border. Many today continue to live with the residue of that.

The further south or west you travelled, it was hard to believe that the peace process meant anything more than an escape from the nightly violence beamed into living rooms and the interminable discussions about a solution. And of course for others, their interest didn’t extend further north than Sainsbury’s in Newry or Asda in Enniskillen. For a small minority the Agreement was seen as a sell-out.

To read the rest of the article by Barbara Walshe visit 15 Years On.

Human rights and women's rights frozen out

Negotiating a peace agreement in a conflict society provides several challenges. First, you need to create a constructive process; second, you need to ensure that the proposals mean something to everyone at the table and third, you have to ensure that what is agreed gets implemented. It could be argued that the Northern Ireland process was a fairly inclusive one, and the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement was a fairly comprehensive one. But what does the aftermath of the agreement look like?

When George Mitchell told the negotiators on Good Friday in 1998 that ‘the hard work starts now’ he meant that implementing the agreement in the spirit in which it was signed would indeed be hard work. And making it work has been like trying to tattoo a balloon. The perceived gains and losses have to keep pace with each other – otherwise some will accuse others of overplaying their hand. So a peace agreement often hangs on the undertakings it makes. But where there is a clash of interpretations about how these should be fulfilled then a feeling of bad faith can quickly replace the more clear-eyed view of the future, such as the one promised on that Good Friday.

An example of this is the Agreement’s proposal on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland which, following St Andrews, all the parties were committed to but have taken no decisions on since then.  Building on the largest public participation exercise ever undertaken in Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission forwarded its advice to the British government in 2008. However, both the British government and the Northern Ireland Executive appear frozen on what to do next.

To read the rest of the article by Monica McWilliams visit 15 Years On.

Northern Ireland Memorials iPhone App

Very excited today about the launch of the INCORE and CAIN Memorials App.

The App acts as a guide to the hundreds of Troubles memorials found in public spaces in Northern Ireland.

As is noted on CAIN: "The new Memorials App provides an interactive guide to the physical memorials allowing users to view information and photographs about each plaque, memorial stone, memorial enclosure or garden, and/or figurative statue, that has been erected in a public space during the conflict. Users can search on-line databases for memorials of interest. Alternatively they can use the geo-locating facility of the iPhone to find memorials that are close to their location. Users can also find basic information on those people commemorated by the memorial".

To find out more and download the App, click here.

Where is our Civic Forum?

Back in the mid-1990s, long before politicians were elected to the Assembly, a broad-based group of people nominated by 10 different political groupings worked long and hard to start the negotiations which eventually led to the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. Pledges were made that each and every one of its many important provisions would be implemented. And many of them have been.

What we have not seen is the same effort given to the establishment and maintenance of the consultative Civic Forum. The inclusion of a Civic Forum on page 9 of the Belfast Agreement is not a ‘maybe’ or a ‘might’; it is a ‘will’.

This consultative body was designed to be an important ‘sounding board’ between the people and the politicians: the place where strongly held opinions from across our many divides could be aired and shared, and where contentious issues around identity, cultural expression, sectarianism, diversity, social justice, social policy and building of community could be discussed.

It would be a place where people could hear each other’s ‘bottom lines’, particularly on the most contentious issues -- such as policing, parades and flags – in the hope that through such sharing the politicians might learn to take account of those ‘bottom lines’ when formulating policy. It was an effort to inject some consensus politics into a society ridden with divisive identity politics.

To read the rest of this article by Anne Carr, visit 15 Years On.

Stuck dancing at the crossroads?

Once upon a time, the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement was all about reconciliation. Its pages are filled with promises of ‘new beginnings’ and ‘dedicated to the achievement of reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust’, all signed ‘in a spirit of concord’. Binding commitments were given not only to purely democratic and political means but to oppose ‘any use or threat of force by others for any political purpose’. Every signatory pledged to ‘work to ensure the success of each and every one of the arrangements’ and signed up to complex but ultimately clear constitutional arrangements: UK sovereignty which it would be ‘wrong to change without consent’; an acceptance that it is the ‘birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose’ which cannot ‘be affected by any future change in the status of Northern Ireland’; and ‘parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos and aspirations of both communities.’ Everyone supported new institutions for equality and human rights, a new Civic Forum, and initiatives for community relations, mixed housing and integrated education.

In spite of opposition from the DUP, over 70% of a very large turn-out voted ‘Yes’. After the St Andrews Agreement in 2006, the theory was that ‘small adjustments’, agreed by the governments and the parties without reference to a referendum, had allowed everyone to sign up.

Yet 15 years later talk of a shared future seems to be more unwelcome than ever.

Read the rest of the article by Duncan Morrow on 15 Years On.

More steep hills to climb…

The controversies surrounding parading last summer, the murder of David Black and the riots over the Union flag serve as stark reminders that we are not yet a settled place. It is easy to feel despondent and believe we have made little progress when we see violence on our streets again or the angry views of our divided politicians.

Nelson Mandela once said: “I have discovered the secret that after climbing a great hill, one only finds that there are many more hills to climb. I have taken a moment here to rest, to steal a view of the glorious vista that surrounds me, to look back on the distance I have come. But I can only rest for a moment, for with freedom come responsibilities, and I dare not linger, for my long walk is not ended.”

Despite 15 years of climbing great hills since the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement, our ‘long walk is not ended.’ We should, of course, take time to ‘steal a view’ of the progress we have made, and should not take that progress for granted. Hundreds of our citizens are alive today, and thousands are safe from injury and fear, because of that progress.

Read the rest of the article by Peter Sheridan on 15 Years On.

15 Years On...

I am part of a group called 15 Years On. It is a group individuals working in peacebuilding, peace research, cross-border and cross-community organisations who have come together to discuss how we might use 2013 to reflect on the successes and failures of the 15 years since the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement and how we might learn from those experiences to do better in the future. In late 2012 we began a year-long conversation about the progress of peace and cooperation in Northern Ireland, and about where we should go from here. We plan this conversation to take place largely online, leading to a culminating event sometime in autumn 2013. I encourage you to visit the project website, http://15yearson.wordpress.com.

Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report

Important event earlier this year and only getting around to provide links to it now, that is the launching of the "Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report: Number One" written by Paul Nolan (Feb, 2012).

The NI Peace Monitoring Report will "provide independent monitoring of Northern Ireland’s journey out of violence, and of the efforts to create a society in which all can live free from fear, and in relationships of trust and safety with their fellow citizens. An indicator framework will be created to allow the measurement of change towards the goals of equality, social cohesion, sharing, and the ability to deal with political difference through open dialogue and accommodation. The findings will be made available to all through the publication of an annual report".

The real value will be in the publication of subsequent reports to see if the monitoring of the data provides useful indicators of progress in Northern Ireland or not. Download the report.

Risk, Uncertainty and Confusion

I have just returned to Northern Ireland from a very busy time visiting Amman in Jordan, then Italy. The first event focused on the issue of a "risk society" hosted by the Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies. The report should be out soon, and I will post my paper shortly which was on fear. Thereafter, went to a workshop on the issue of reparations for gross violations of human rights in Italy, which is a fascinating and burgeoning subject. The project is part of the ICTJ's global study of reparations measures following transitions to democracy. The aim is to examine not just proposals in favor of reparations made by truth commissions and other bodies, but also reparations legislation, particularly its implementation over time. And...now after all that...I am back in Northern Ireland, where the peace process is in a whirl...not sure too laugh or cry...it really seems to be in a shambles today.